Addressing the psychological needs of conflicting parties as a key to promoting reconciliation: The perspective of the Needs-based Model

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Abstract

Reconciliation processes have attracted much scientific interest over the last two decades. In the present paper, after discussing the difficulty in defining the elusive concept of reconciliation, I will present the theoretical perspective of the Needs-based Model of reconciliation. According to this model, transgressions threaten the identities of victims and perpetrators in an asymmetrical manner. Victims experience threat to their sense of agency, whereas perpetrators experience threat to their moral image. The restoration of victims’ and perpetrators’ positive identities (e.g., through the exchange of empowering and accepting messages, or through identity-affirmation interventions) may increase their willingness to reconcile with each other. I will present empirical evidence supporting the Needs-based Model’s hypotheses in various contexts including interpersonal transgressions, direct intergroup violence, structural inequality, and duality of social roles (i.e., when both parties transgress against each other and engage in “competitive victimhood”). Finally, I will discuss the practical implications of the model and point to future research avenues.

Keywords

reconciliation, social identity, empowerment, acceptance, the needs-based model
1 Introduction

Since the birth of social psychology as an independent discipline, much attention has been devoted to the study of conflict resolution (Jones 1998). The underlying assumptions of most of this research, which was inspired by economic theories (such as the game theory), were that conflicts are grounded in disputes over tangible resources such as money, land or property and that the adversaries are motivated to maximize their utilities (i.e., benefit as much as they can). Therefore, conflict resolution means reaching an agreed-upon formula, such as a peace treaty or a contract, for distributing the contested resources between the adversaries.

The concept of reconciliation—which aims to capture the emotional aspects of this process—was introduced into the scientific discourse by primatologists de Waal and van Roosmalen (1979) in their reports of friendly reunions between former chimpanzee opponents soon after aggressive confrontations. However, it took almost two more decades before mainstream social psychology began to devote greater attention to the study of reconciliation and the definition of this concept has remained somewhat elusive. Staub (2008), for example, who studied reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda, defined it as the process of healing the relations between former adversaries. Kelman (2008) defined it as a process of identity change in which each party becomes able to remove the negation of the other’s identity as a core element of its own identity. Čehajić-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, and Halperin (2016) defined reconciliation as the removal of the emotional barriers that block the path to harmonious relations (e.g., by reducing anger and fear, and increasing hope).
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The latter approach has been criticized for creating, perhaps unintentionally, the impression that “it is all in our head,” while ignoring the context that gives rise to these so-called “emotional barriers” (e.g., Rouhana 2011). For example, if a group is subjected to an apartheid regime, its members are likely to be angry, but anger is the result rather than the cause of the conflict. As yet another example, if one suffers from an aggressive neighbor, one is likely to feel fearful, but again fear is the result, rather than the cause of the conflict.

Bearing this criticism in mind, we define reconciliation as the restoration of trustworthy relations between former adversaries who enjoy positive social identities and interact in equality (Nadler/Shnabel 2015). Admittedly, of these three components—trust, equality, and positive identities—the research presented in this paper focuses on the latter one. Yet it is critical to frame this research within the larger context. That is to present the “big picture” about what reconciliation is before “zooming in” into discussing the role of identity-restoration processes to removing the psychological barriers between adversaries.

A primary social mechanism through which such barriers can be removed is the apology forgiveness cycle. These symbolic gestures, namely, the expression of an apology or forgiveness, can dramatically transform the relations between former adversaries (Tavuchis 1991)—making them feel better even though neither apology nor forgiveness can undo what has been done. The famous kneeling of the German chancellor Willy Brandt in Warsaw, through which he expressed deep sorrow for the crimes of the Nazis, illustrates how powerful and meaningful such symbolic gestures can be. The language that people use when referring to the apology forgiveness cycle (e.g., expressions such as “you owe me an apology” or “I accepted your apology”) implies that reconciliation reflects an act of social exchange in which the conflicting parties exchange symbolic “commodities.” The Needs-based Model of reconciliation (Nadler/Shnabel 2015; Shnabel/Nadler 2015), reviewed in the next section, was developed to explain these exchange acts.

2 The Needs-based Model: Basic logic and empirical support

Anchored in the theoretical tradition of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel/Turner 1986), the main tenet of the Needs-based Model is that transgressions threaten specific dimensions in the identities of victims and perpetrators. In identifying the dimensions impaired among victims and perpetrators, the Needs-based Model builds on the “Big Two” theorizing (Abele/Wojciszke 2013), according to which there are two fundamental dimensions along which people judge social targets: the agency dimension, representing traits like “strong,” “competent,” and “influential” and the moral-social dimension, representing traits like “moral,” “warm,” and “trustworthy.”

Transgressions, according to the Needs-based Model, threaten victims’ and perpetrators’ identities asymmetrically: victims, who feel inferior regarding their ability
to influence their outcomes, experience threat to their agentic identity. Perpetrators, by contrast, suffer from threat to their moral-social identity. While this threat is sometimes accompanied by guilt feelings, many times perpetrators view their behavior as legitimate under the circumstances (Baumeister 1997). However, regardless if they feel guilty or not, perpetrators know that social exclusion is the sanction imposed upon those who are perceived, whether rightfully or wrongfully, to breach the moral standards of their community (Tavuchis, 1991). Therefore, they are likely to experience anxiety over social exclusion. For example, Israeli citizens may fear the boycott of their country, regardless of whether or not they view its conduct to be immoral.

The experience of these threats produces different motivational states. Victims, weak and humiliated, experience the need to restore their agency and may behave vengefully in order to regain power (cf. Frijda 1994). Perpetrators experience the need to restore their moral image and gain (re)acceptance to the community from which they feel potentially excluded, and may engage in moral disengagement (e.g., minimizing the harm’s severity; Bandura 1990) to downplay their culpability. However, exchange interactions through which victims and perpetrators satisfy each other’s needs for empowerment and acceptance may open them for reconciliation.

In particular, perpetrators’ apology constitutes an admission of owing victims a moral debt which returns control to the victims’ hands. Perpetrators may also empower their victims by expressing respect for their achievements and abilities, or, in the case of victimized groups, appealing to their national pride and heritage. On the other end, victims’ expressions of forgiveness and empathy towards perpetrators’ perspective mitigate their moral inferiority and reassure their belongingness. Victims can also express acceptance of their perpetrators through readiness to form friendships or engage in economic and cultural cooperation. A successful exchange of empowerment and acceptance can restore the conflicting parties’ positive identities through symbolically erasing the roles of “powerless victim” and “immoral perpetrator”, resulting in their heightened readiness to reconcile with each other. Figure 1 summarizes the proposed process.
Two series of studies tested the model’s hypotheses using diverse methodologies and contexts. The first series (Shnabel/Nadler 2008) focused on interpersonal transgressions. For this, we developed and used the “creativity test” experimental paradigm in which participants were randomly assigned to be either “writers” who composed marketing slogans for a list of products or “judges” who evaluated these slogans. There were two types of writer-judge dyads: control dyads and experimental dyads. In both types of dyads, writers had allegedly failed their “test” whereas judges had allegedly passed it. However, the instructions provided to participants were different in the experimental and control dyads. In the experimental dyads, judges were instructed to be strict in their evaluations. They were also told that being too nice could harm their own chances of passing the test. By the end of the session, participants (i.e., judges and writers) in the experimental dyads were told that the judges passed the test whereas writers failed it due to the harsh evaluations they received from their judges. In the control dyads, judges were instructed to be relatively lenient. Participants were later informed that the judges passed the test whereas writers failed it due to the decision of an external committee. Thus, in both the experimental and control dyads judges passed the test and writers failed it, which allowed us to control for information about success or failure. However, only in the experimental dyads judges deliberately failed their partners to improve their own chances of passing the test, hence their success was gained at the expense of the writers. As expected,
writers in the experimental dyads (i.e., victims) had the lowest sense of agency and the highest need for power (i.e., compared to writers in the control dyads and to judges in either the experimental or the control dyads). Correspondingly, judges in the experimental dyads (i.e., perpetrators) had the lowest moral image and the highest need for acceptance (i.e., compared to judges in the control dyads and to writers in the experimental or control dyads). The same pattern of results occurred in an experimental paradigm that used real-life transgressions by asking participants to recall a personal episode in which they had either hurt or been hurt by a significant other.

We next tested the model’s prediction that addressing victims’ and perpetrators’ needs should increase their willingness to reconcile with each other. For this purpose, we again used the creativity-test experimental paradigm to randomly assign participants to the role of victim or perpetrator. Following the transgression (i.e., after participants learned that the writer failed the test due to the harsh evaluations of the judge who herself passed the test), participants received a message from their partner that expressed, depending on the experimental condition, empowerment (i.e., acknowledgement of their high competence), social acceptance (i.e., acknowledgement of their high social skills), or neither. As expected, victims’ readiness to reconcile was highest in the empowerment condition (compared to the acceptance or control conditions) whereas perpetrators’ readiness to reconcile was highest in the acceptance condition (compared to the empowerment or control conditions). The same pattern of results occurred in two experiments that used role-playing scenarios of transgressions.

The second series of studies (Shnabel/Nadler et al. 2009) focused on intergroup transgressions. One study exposed Jewish and German participants to two speeches, allegedly made by their outgroup’s representatives at the Berlin Holocaust memorial. The speeches’ main message conveyed either acceptance (e.g., “we should accept the [Jews/Germans] and remember that we are all human beings”) or empowerment (e.g., “the [Germans’/Jews’] have the right to be strong and proud in their country”). As expected, Jews showed greater readiness to reconcile with Germans following empowering messages whereas Germans showed greater readiness to reconcile following accepting messages.

Of course, the different pattern of responses to messages obtained among Jews and Germans could be attributed to cultural differences between the two groups rather than to their different social roles when referring to the Second World War. To rule out this alternative explanation, we replicated this experiment in the context of relations between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs when referring to the Kefar Kosem killings. In this event, which took place in October of 1956, the Jewish-Israeli border patrol killed 43 unarmed Arab civilians for violating a curfew that had recently been imposed. Using the same experimental procedure as in the German-Jewish study, we exposed Israeli Arabs and Jews to speeches conveying messages of empowerment or acceptance. The speeches were ostensibly made by representatives of their outgroup on the 50th
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anniversary of the killings. Consistent with logic of the Needs-based Model, while Arabs were more willing to reconcile following a message of empowerment than of acceptance from the Jews, Jews were more willing to reconcile following a message of acceptance than of empowerment from the Arabs. Taken together, the two sets of studies provided empirical support to the Needs-based Model in contexts of both interpersonal and intergroup transgressions.

3 When both parties hurt each other: Extending the model to “dual” contexts

In its original formulation, the Needs-based Model referred to situations in which the roles of “victims” and “perpetrators” were consensual, clear-cut and mutually exclusive. However, in many (if not most) conflicts both parties transgress against each other and serve as victims and perpetrators simultaneously. In one experiment that explored this “duality” (SimanTov-Nachlieli/Shnabel 2014) participants worked in dyads and had to allocate valuable resources (e.g., monetary prizes or credit points). Participants then received feedback on the allocation task which constituted the experimental manipulation: In the control condition, participants were informed that both their own and their partner’s allocations were fair; in the victim condition—that their partner’s allocation was unfair; in the perpetrator condition—that their allocation was unfair; and in the dual condition—that both their and their partner’s allocations were unfair. In terms of psychological needs, duals showed heightened needs for both agency (e.g., similar to victims, they expressed a greater wish to have more influence over the study’s results) and positive moral image (e.g., similar to perpetrators, they expressed a greater wish to explain to their partner that they tried to behave in a fair manner).

In terms of behavior, however, like victims, duals’ heightened need for agency translated into vengefulness. For example, when given an opportunity to do so, both victims and duals (but not perpetrators) denied resources from their partners. Unlike perpetrators, duals’ heightened need for positive moral image failed to translate into pro-sociality. For example, when given an opportunity to do so, as opposed to perpetrators, both victims and duals were reluctant of donating resources to their partners. Corresponding patterns were obtained in intergroup contexts of dual conflicts in which group members often engage in “competitive victimhood” (i.e., disputes over who the “real” victim of the conflict is; Noor/Shnabel et al. 2012). Taken together, our findings point to the precedence of agency-related over morality-related needs in determining duals’ behavior; a phenomenon that we called the primacy of agency.

The notion of primacy of agency is consistent with Mazziotta, Feuchte, Gausel and Nadler’s (2014) finding that the experience of victimization is more psychologically profound than the experience of perpetration. In a study among conflicting groups in
Liberia, which experienced two civil wars during the years 1989 and 2003, Mazziotta et al. (2014) have asked participants to write about an episode in which either their ingroup had victimized people from an adversarial group or another group had victimized their own. In line with previous findings of group members’ biased historical memory (Sahdra/Ross 2007), participants indicated that they found it easier to recall episodes of in-group victimhood than in-group perpetration. Moreover, half of those asked to describe an event in which their group had perpetrated violence against an outgroup also described how their group had been victimized by this outgroup. None of those asked to describe an event of victimization described how the in-group had perpetrated violence against the outgroup. Finally, the descriptions in the victim condition were longer and more detailed than those in the perpetrator condition.

The finding that the experience of victimization exerts more influence on behavior than the experience of perpetration, leading to the primacy of agency observed in our studies, implies a somewhat pessimistic outlook on the reconciliation potential of individuals or groups involved in dual conflicts. Leaving some room for optimism, we theorized, based on the logic of the Needs-based Model, that addressing duals’ pressing need for agency may reduce vengeful, anti-social tendencies and foster pro-social tendencies instead.

Trying to identify a strategy to restore duals’ agentic identity, we turned to research on self-affirmation theory (Steele 1988) which has later been extended to the group level. This research has demonstrated that the negative effects of various social identity threats on individuals’ or group members’ attributions, achievements, motivations, attitudes, and behaviors can be alleviated by affirming positive aspects of their self or in-group identity. For example, smokers’ defensive response to threatening health information (i.e., refusal to accept the validity of a scientific article indicating that smoking harms health) was eliminated when they had an opportunity to affirm their selves through writing about the values important to them (Crocker/Niiya et al. 2008). Similarly, group-serving biases among basketball fans (attributing the outcome of the game to their team’s performance when their team won but not when it lost) were eliminated when they had an opportunity to affirm their in-group’s identity through writing about the values important to their group (Sherman/Kinias et al. 2007).

Whereas earlier research on self-affirmation suggested that threats in one domain can be addressed through affirmation of another unrelated domain (Steele 1988), more recent research (e.g., Knowles/Lucas et al. 2010) has revealed that group-affirmation is effective only to the extent that there is a “match” between the type of threat and the content of the affirmation. Applying this insight to contexts of dual conflicts, we theorized that to effectively reduce anti-social tendencies in such conflicts, self or group affirmations must target the in-group’s agency. Two series of studies tested this theorizing, examining whether agency-affirmation—reminding and reassuring individuals or group members of their (personal or collective) competence and self-
determination—would satisfy their pressing need for agency and thus reduce anti-social and increase pro-social tendencies towards the other party to the conflict.

The first set of studies (SimanTov-Nachlieli/Shnabel et al. 2017) examined interpersonal dual conflicts. In one experiment, for example, participants were instructed to think about a colleague with whom they had a conflict in which they had both hurt each other. After reporting their level of commitment to their relationship with this colleague, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions: In the agency-affirmation condition, participants had to think and write about a situation in their lives (unrelated to the conflict that they had just described) in which they felt assertive, self-determined, influential, competent, resilient or having inner strength. In the morality-affirmation condition, participants had to think and write about a situation in their lives in which they were fair, moral, thoughtful or considerate towards other people. In the control condition, participants had to think and write about their morning routine. Then, participants were reminded of the conflict about which they had written in the first part of the experiment and asked to report their conciliatory tendencies towards their colleague.

Participants in the agency-affirmation condition, but not in the morality-affirmation condition, reported more conciliatory tendencies towards their colleague—especially in low-commitment relationships (in which people are most concerned about their own needs, rather than about the needs of their partner or the relationship with him or her; Rusbult/Martz et al. 1998). This pattern of interaction, in which agency affirmation promotes conciliatory tendencies in dual conflicts characterized by low commitment relationships, was replicated in additional contexts; e.g., when the dual conflict was induced in the lab, commitment level was experimentally manipulated (by leading participants to believe they would either or not have a subsequent face-to-face encounter with their partner) and conciliatory tendencies were measured by observing participants’ actual behavior (rather than self-reported).

The second set of studies (SimanTov-Nachlieli/Shnabel et al. 2018) examined dual conflicts between groups. To illustrate, in one experiment Swiss participants showed more pro-social tendencies towards the EU, with whom their country was in conflict following the 2014 referendum to restrict immigration to Switzerland if they completed a short exercise in which they wrote about Switzerland being advanced and successful (an agency-affirmation manipulation). Similar patterns were observed in other contexts of conflict. For example, among Israeli leftists and rightists referring to the conflict between their political camps (in which they both feel victimized), reading a short text about the influence of their political camp in shaping the state’s character (again, an agency-affirmation manipulation) led to greater willingness to relinquish some power for the sake of being moral towards the other camp. This, in turn, led to more pro-social behavior (e.g., in an investment game). Notably, affirming the morality (rather than agency) of their political camp failed to promote Israeli leftists’ and rightists’
conciliatory tendencies—suggesting that not every positive affirmation “can do the trick.” Rather, the affirmation has to be focused on the identity dimension about which dual conflicting parties care the most, namely, their agency.

4 When one party is stronger than the other: Extending the model to contexts of structural inequality

Intergroup conflict manifests not only in direct violence (e.g., war or terror attacks) but also in structural disparity, namely, unequal social arrangements that privilege some groups while depriving others. According to the stereotype content model (Fiske/Cuddy et al. 2007), this inequality translates into differential group stereotypes which threaten different dimensions of advantaged and disadvantaged groups’ identities: disadvantaged groups are often perceived as warm but incompetent and advantaged groups as competent but cold and immoral. The finding that within interracial (but not intra-racial) interactions, African-Americans were motivated to gain respect, whereas Caucasian-Americans were motivated to be liked (Bergsieker/Shelton et al. 2010), suggests that these differential stereotypes may lead to the experience of divergent needs among members of disadvantaged and advantaged groups—in line with the logic of the Needs-based Model.

Subsequent research (Siem/von Oetingen et al. 2013) demonstrated that the needs of advantaged- and disadvantaged-group members correspond to those of perpetrators and victims only when group inequality is perceived as illegitimate. For example, in one experiment, students of clinical psychology were randomly assigned to either the high-status or the low-status condition by comparing themselves to either social workers (an outgroup with a lower professional status) or psychiatrists (an outgroup with a higher professional status). They were then assigned to one of two experimental conditions: In the legitimacy condition, participants learned that intergroup status differences stemmed from different specialization requirements, whereas in the illegitimacy condition participants learned that clinical psychologists and outgroup members perform similar work in mental health institutions.

As predicted, Siem et al. (2013) found that in the legitimacy condition there were no differences between high- and low-status members in terms of needs for moral-social acceptance and agency. However, in the illegitimacy condition, high-status group members’ need for acceptance was higher than that of low-status group members, whereas the opposite pattern emerged for the need for agency. A consistent pattern was observed in a correlational study which found that power and morality needs among advantaged and disadvantaged group members’ (e.g., cis-heterosexual and sexual minorities) were moderated by their level of system justification, namely, the extent to which they perceived the existing social arrangements as fair and legitimate (Hässler/Shnabel et al. 2018).
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Additional studies (Shnabel/Ullrich et al. 2013) found that messages from the outgroup that reassured the advantaged group’s morality and the disadvantaged group’s competence not only improved their attitudes toward each other but also increased their readiness to collectively act for equality (through demonstrations, petitions, etc.). These findings highlight the critical role of identity restoration processes in promoting structural equality. The traditional view is that advantaged groups cannot be the drivers of social change, because they are primarily motivated to maintain their privilege. Yet Shnabel et al.’s (2013) findings show that once their threatened moral image is reassured, advantaged-group members may be readier to exhibit solidarity with the disadvantaged group. These findings further suggest that restoring disadvantaged group members’ sense of agency can prevent them from passively accepting their lower status.

Practical interventions to promote positive intergroup relations through contact across group boundaries which often focus on the communion dimension (e.g., fostering cross-group friendship), should, therefore, also address power-related issues and directly challenge the stereotypical perception of disadvantaged groups as incompetent (for a similar recommendation, see Saguy/Dovidio et al. 2008).

5 Conclusion and Future Directions

The scientific study of reconciliation, both within and outside social psychology, is relatively young. Additional research can, therefore, be highly valuable. Two directions of research may be especially intriguing. First, while the research presented in this paper tells us what kinds of messages should be ideally exchanged between members of conflicting groups, it is still unknown under what conditions such an exchange is most likely to occur. Therefore, future research should identify the factors that increase the chances that the parties involved in a conflict would choose to engage in exchanging the emotional “commodities” that they need from each other.

A first step in this direction was done by Ditlmann, Purdie-Vaughns, Dovidio, and Naft’s (2017) research which pointed to the critical role of the implicit power motive, namely, the motivation and ability to influence others (Schultheiss/Brunstein 2002). Specifically, Ditlmann et al. (2017) found that when discussing the history of slavery in the U.S., Black participants who were high (rather than low) in implicit power motive used more affiliative communication and immediacy behaviors towards their White counterparts, which in turn increased Whites’ engagement with the topic of past injustices and readiness to act for racial equality. Put differently, members of the historical victim (and presently disadvantaged) group with a high implicit power motive used communication strategies that satisfied the heightened acceptance needs of members of a historical perpetrator (and presently advantaged) group. These strategies elicited responses among members of the perpetrator group with the potential to satisfy
the victim group members’ need for empowerment. Hence, interactions that include high implicit power individuals are more likely to result in needs satisfaction for both parties.

A second direction for future research would be to examine whether applying the insights of the Needs-based Model can enhance the effectiveness of restorative justice procedures. Restorative justice is an approach to justice that tries to foster a dialogue between all stakeholders (the victims, perpetrators, and the community), and is often contrasted to the traditional punitive approach which focuses on punishing the perpetrator as a means to restore justice (Boyce-Watson 2008). In restorative justice procedures, which are sometimes used in the criminal system and in other systems such as schools, victims take an active role (so their voice is being heard), while offenders are encouraged to take responsibility for their actions and to repair the harm they have caused (e.g., by apologizing or by offering compensation or community service). It may be interesting to examine whether victims’ satisfaction of the outcomes and perpetrators’ avoidance of repeating the offense, is influenced by the extent to which they feel empowered and morally accepted (respectively) through the use of these procedures.

In conclusion, in line with the understanding that “what goes on between people cannot be separated from what is going on within people” (Gopin 2004, p. 14), the main insight provided by research on the Needs-based Model is that restoring the positive identities of conflicting parties can prepare their minds and hearts to reconciliation. Once their threatened identities are restored, conflicting parties show greater generosity towards each other and may even give up some power for the sake of moral considerations. While the scientific study of reconciliation is still in its early stages, I hope that the joint effort of myself, as well as other researchers of this topic, will build a large body of knowledge that allows a better understanding of reconciliation-related processes. Hopefully, this knowledge will be useful not only for researchers but also to practitioners who engage in conflict reduction.
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