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Putting Emotion Regulation in Context: The (Missing) Role of Power Relations, Intergroup Trust, and Groups’ Need for Positive Identities in Reconciliation Processes

Nurit Shnabel and Johannes Ullrich

The target article by Čehajić-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, and Halperin presents an innovative theoretical synthesis of the literature on intergroup emotions and on emotion regulation. Focusing on the appraisal phase of the modal model of emotion (Gross, 2015), Čehajić-Clancy et al. offer a comprehensive review of social-psychological interventions, the goal of which is to regulate group members’ emotions in the interest of intergroup reconciliation. We deeply sympathize with Čehajić-Clancy et al.’s goals and wish to formulate such a framework for interventions. Still, we suspect that the emotion regulation perspective, with its historical roots in individual-level psychology (i.e., Freud’s psychoanalytic tradition, which attempted to help individuals regulate their anxiety; Gross, 1998) is incomplete, because it neglects the asymmetries and mutual dependencies between the emotions on both sides of the conflict. Our most general argument is that as an intergroup phenomenon, emotions associated with group conflict can be fully understood only by considering the relations between the groups involved. This includes important issues of power, trust, and need for positive collective identity, all of which are relational, group-level concepts that are easily overlooked by an individualistic approach.

In the target article, Čehajić-Clancy et al. define reconciliation as the “postconflict resolution process of removing psychological barriers such as negative emotions and beliefs about former/current enemy groups with the goal of creating or restoring positive and sustainable intergroup relations” (p. 73), a definition borrowed from work on interpersonal reconciliation (i.e., Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). They go on to suggest that some emotions inherently further the process of reconciliation (i.e., empathy, hope, and collective guilt), whereas others inherently impede it (i.e., anger and hatred). However, reconciliation is not only a process but also an outcome, an outcome that in our opinion is best defined as “trustworthy positive relations between former adversaries who enjoy secure social identities and interact in an equality-based social environment” (Nadler & Shnabel, 2015, p. 95). This definition, which builds on the theorizing of previous peace and reconciliation researchers (i.e., Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008; Galtung, 1969; Kelman, 2008; Rouhana, 2004; Staub, 2006), refers to three components—trust, equality, and positive social identities—that are missing from Čehajić-Clancy et al.’s definition yet reflect, as we argue, the essence of intergroup reconciliation.

Indeed, intergroup reconciliation is an elusive concept, and there is an ongoing controversy pertaining to what its core aspects are (for a thorough discussion of key issues of dispute, see Meierhenrich, 2008; Nadler, 2012). The definition that we prefer to use highlights the fundamental point of this commentary: Any discussion of the role of emotion regulation processes in intergroup reconciliation must take the social context into account. Contrary to the current presentation of Čehajić-Clancy et al.’s framework, intergroup emotions may not be inherently functional or dysfunctional but derive their meaning from the given intergroup context. Moreover, the type of emotions that group members may feel (e.g., humiliation by or contempt toward the conflicting outgroup) are shaped by contextual factors, such as the power relations between the groups and the extent to which these power asymmetries allow group members to enjoy a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). A fuller understanding of the intergroup context is therefore vital for judging the merit of the proposed interventions.

In this commentary, we focus on three points, elaborated in the following sections: (a) What is the role of intergroup trust in determining the effectiveness of the proposed interventions? (b) How do power relations create asymmetries in psychological needs and consequent group-based emotions? and (c) How are group-based emotions shaped by group members’ motivation to maintain a positive social identity? After expanding on these points, which are directly related to our own theoretical approach, we discuss one additional issue—the advantages of studying the interplay between the different emotions rather than studying each of them separately, as was done in the target article.

The Crucial Role of Trust in Determining the Interventions’ Effectiveness and the Distinction Between Instrumental Versus Socioemotional Routes to Reconciliation

Almost by definition, social psychological research aims to build a bridge between what goes on “within people” to what goes on “between people,” that is, to tie the “psychological” to the “social.” In the case at hand, conceptualizing intergroup reconciliation merely as a process of emotional regulation ignores the fact that reconciliation occurs within a particular context of intergroup relations that determines the meaning of
group members’ emotional responses (i.e., whether they are functional or maladaptive; see next). A key aspect of the relational component of intergroup reconciliation is the level of intergroup trust, which was identified as critical for the restoration of positive intergroup relations from the early days of research on conflict resolution (e.g., Deutsch, 1961; Osgood, 1962; see also Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). In the absence of trust, it is extremely difficult to reach an agreement between the conflicting parties on ceasing violence and distributing contested resources, not to mention on taking socioemotional steps, such as expressing collective public apologies (see Kelman, 2008). The framework proposed in the target article does not relate to trust as a unique and critical component of intergroup reconciliation, and as such it misses three important points.

First, group members’ response to the interventions reviewed by Cehajić-Clancy et al. might be moderated by trust level. For example, an apology offered under low levels of trust might backfire (i.e., lead to heightened instead of reduced levels of anger) because it is interpreted as insincere and even manipulative (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; see also Shnabel, Halabi, & SimanTov-Nachlieli, 2015). Second, some of the interventions reviewed are effective not only because they regulate key emotions but also because they increase trust in the other party when conflict occurs. To illustrate, under certain conditions, apologies may increase the recipients’ perceptions that the offender group sincerely regrets the wrongdoing (Wohl et al., 2015) and does not intend to repeat it in the future (see Shnabel, Nadler, & Dovidio, 2014), and these perceptions in turn increase forgiveness. Thus, the mechanism leading to conciliatory tendencies is increased trust in the outgroup’s positive intentions (rather than internal reduction of anger that is occurring independently of the other party). Third, in the absence of trust, emotions such as fear, anger, and even vengeance can be highly functional and adaptive rather than obstacles that need to be removed.

The latter point is especially important because it captures key insights of the peace literature, on one hand, and works on the functionality of emotions, on the other. According to Christie et al. (2008), the field of peace psychology is often criticized for being “soft, weak, naïve, idealistic… erroneously buying into Rousseau’s notion of innate goodness or Locke’s assumption about the malleability of behavior” (p. 548). Christie et al.’s response to this criticism is that peace psychology should not operate under the premise that cooperative, conciliatory tendencies are always desirable. Instead, it should identify the conditions under which cooperative approaches lead to constructive relational outcomes (Deutsch, 1973) and the conditions under which it is competitive, even forceful approaches that ultimately lead to more constructive outcomes (White, 1995). In a similar vein, an evolutionary perspective on emotions suggests that emotions such as fear or vengeance are adaptive, because they promote goals such as escaping from threats (e.g., Frijda, 1986) or creating deterrence (e.g., McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013). The proposed framework ignores these insights and implies a simple equation in which anger and hatred are destructive emotions that need to be reduced, whereas guilt, empathy, and hope are constructive emotions that need to be increased. Sadly, this is not always the case. A striking example can be found in British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s conciliatory approach following Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia; here, the regulation of feelings such as anger and hope led to detrimental consequences. That is, when the conflicting group cannot be trusted, feelings of hope might be destructive, whereas anger might turn out to be constructive.¹

The understanding that the establishment of trust might be a prerequisite before the emotional aspects of reconciliation can be addressed serves as the basis for the distinction between instrumental and socioemotional routes to reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). The instrumental route consists of acts of pragmatic cooperation to achieve common instrumental goals; examples from the Middle East context may include joint patrols of the Israel Defense Force and Jordanian Army in the Jordan Valley to prevent guerrilla infiltration, or regional initiatives to prevent environmental pollution. The socioemotional route consists of removing the emotional barriers (e.g., victims’ humiliation or perpetrators’ shame) that block the path to more harmonious relations; examples from the Canadian context may be the government’s apology for the abuse of indigenous people, or the Chinese head tax.

The distinction between the two types of routes offers insights pertaining to the interventions that should be applied in different phases (i.e., violent vs. post-violent phase)² and types (i.e., intra- vs. intersocietal type) of conflicts. To illustrate, building trust through graduated and reciprocated positive gestures between the two conflicting parties (i.e., Osgood’s, 1962, GRIT proposal) may be a prerequisite before socioemotional aspects such as increasing intergroup empathy can be addressed. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that attempts to increase intergroup empathy during the violent phase of a conflict, under conditions of mistrust, might backlash and increase rather than reduce intergroup tension (Paluck, 2010). In other words, during the violent phase of a conflict, efforts to prevent escalation should focus on the instrumental rather than the socioemotional route to reconciliation.

The type of relations between the groups also influences the desired route to reconciliation. For example, based on Bilwicz’s (2007) finding that Polish–Jewish dialogue groups led to more positive outgroup attitudes when they focused on contemporary rather than historical issues, Cehajić-Clancy et al. conclude in their target article that “discussions with a focus on

¹ In fact, even regardless the level of trust, the dichotomy between “constructive” and “destructive” emotions is not as clear-cut as the proposed framework implies. For example, anger may increase group members’ engagement in collective action to reduce group inequality (Iyer & Leach, 2009; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). As such, it may be highly constructive (rather than destructive) for promotion of positive peace, namely, the promotion of social arrangements that eliminate group-based inequalities (Christie et al., 2008). At the opposite end, feelings of responsibility for the Nazis’ wrongdoings might lead to the experience of “Holocaust fatigue” and even secondary anti-Semitism among Germans (see Imhoff & Banse, 2009). Thus, at a certain point, the experience of collective guilt might become deconstructive for reconciliation.

² Admittedly, Cehajić-Clancy et al. initially state that their framework refers only to the postviolent phase of intergroup conflicts, which “takes place mostly after the formal disagreements have already been addressed” (during the conflict resolution phase)³ (p. 3: see Christie et al., 2008; Kelman, 2008; and Lederach, 1995, for the distinction between different phases of intergroup conflicts). However, much of the reviewed research refers to conflicts in their violent phase, and the terminology is switched to discuss “(post)conflict contexts” (e.g., p. 74 in the target article).

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the past marked by conflict might inhibit potentially positive consequences of contact or perspective-taking due to specific frustrated emotional needs related to the past” (p. 83). This implies that intergroup discussions (e.g., in structured intergroup encounters) should not focus on the painful past. Whereas this conclusion may be valid for conflicts between societies, such as the conflict between the Jewish and Polish societies, it may be less suitable for conflicts within societies, such as the conflict between Blacks and Whites in South Africa.

In the latter case, facing the truth about past atrocities was vital for the society’s healing process (Tutu, 1999). Put differently, strategies to promote instrumental reconciliation may suffice when the goal is to reach positive, cooperative relations between separate entities but may not suffice when the goal is to integrate the adversarial parties into a single social unit (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008).

Obviously, it might be highly beneficial to study processes of emotional regulation within a theoretical framework that distinguishes between the instrumental and socioemotional routes to reconciliation. For example, beliefs pertaining to groups’ and conflicts’ malleability that regulate emotions such as hatred (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, & Dweck, 2011) and hope (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014) may influence perceptions related to trust (e.g., hope may be critical for the parties to be willing to make trust-building gestures). If so, increasing hope and reducing hatred might be especially important for promoting instrumental reconciliation, whereas regulating guilt (i.e., increasing the parties’ readiness to admit their ingroup’s responsibility for wrongdoings) might be especially critical for socioemotional reconciliation. Still, utterly ignoring the distinction between the two routes to reconciliation for the sake of a more integrative approach (as Čehajić-Clancy et al. suggest) might cloud important insights pertaining to the role of trust and trust-building in intergroup reconciliation processes.

### Power Relations and Asymmetries in Identity-Related Needs

The second contextual factor that is missing from the framework proposed by Čehajić-Clancy et al. but that some theorists view as the core aspect of reconciliation, especially in contexts where the conflicting groups share a common society (e.g., in South Africa; Du Toit & Doxtader, 2010), is transformation of the power relations between the groups (see also Christie et al.’s, 2008, notion of “positive peace,” defined as social arrangements that eliminate group-based inequality and injustice). In many cases, intergroup conflict occurs between groups of unequal power, such that even though there are mutual transgressions (e.g., terror attacks and counterattacks; Siman-Tov-Nachlieli, & Shnabel, 2014), one group experiences more human rights violations in the form of apartheid regime, military occupation, ethnic cleansing, and so on. In cases like these, reconciliation must consist of fundamental macrolevel changes, such as nationalization of resources, substantial changes in policy and legislation, and so forth (e.g., Rouhana, 2004).

Admittedly, as social psychologists we tend to pay less attention to this component of intergroup reconciliation, because many of the processes leading to macrolevel changes of this kind (e.g., the embargo on South Africa, which played a causal role in the fall of the Apartheid regime; Levy, 1999) are studied primarily in neighboring disciplines, such as sociology or political science. Nevertheless, reducing intergroup reconciliation to individuals’ emotion regulation misses the critical role of transformation of power relations in reaching genuine reconciliation.

The proposed framework implies that reconciliation will be achieved once every individual member of the conflicting groups stops feeling anger or hatred toward the outgroup and experiences instead guilt about their ingroup’s bad actions, empathy toward the outgroup, and hope that the conflict can be resolved. However, it ignores the possibility that these emotions may be the result of enduring social inequalities, which means that regulating them is equivalent to treating the symptoms rather than the disease. To illustrate, lack of feeling guilty about terror attacks perpetrated by their ingroup among members of the weaker party to the conflict might stem from the absence of alternative efficient means available to their group (see Rouhana, 2004, for a discussion of terror as the tool of the powerless). Echoing a similar criticism of the contact hypothesis (see Dixon, Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2005), we argue that this theoretical individualism of the proposed framework makes it vulnerable to ideological exploitation. This concern has been repeatedly voiced by Rouhana (2004, 2008, 2011):

The imposition of a therapeutic model … threatens to reduce a powerful intergroup process with clear implications for social restructuring to an intra-psychic process. This process overlooks the centrality of group identities formed over generations of conflict by power relations, dominance, oppression, and group exploitation. Such a model not only misplaces the focus of analysis from intergroup patterns of behavior that are the outcome of power structures to their interpersonal manifestations, but also obscures the chain of causality with grave theoretical and moral implications. … Placing the emphasis on individual healing without attending to the larger social and political context simply misses the target and becomes the dubious privilege of those who can afford to deny, avoid, or overlook the need for political change and its political implications. (Rouhana, 2004, pp. 174–180)

The understanding that groups do not usually emerge from conflicts as equals lies at the basis of the needs-based model of reconciliation (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009; Shnabel & Nadler, 2015), which we now describe in detail. Our own work on the needs-based model of reconciliation illustrates the importance of power asymmetries in determining group members’ identity-related needs and, potentially, consequent emotions. It also demonstrates how addressing the psychological needs of members of victim and perpetuator groups can not only improve their emotional orientation toward the outgroup but also increase their readiness to engage in collective action for the sake of promoting a more just social arrangement (Shnabel, Ullrich, Nadler, Dovidio, & Aydin, 2013) and thus contribute to the power transformation that is a critical component of reconciliation (Shnabel & Ullrich, 2013).
The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation

Building on the social identity perspective and its emphasis on group members’ fundamental motivation to maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), the needs-based model conceptualized the socioemotional route to reconciliation as a process of identity restoration (Nadler & Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009). This conceptualization was based on Kelman’s (2008) definition of reconciliation as a process of identity change. Our theoretical account extends Kelman’s (2008) theorizing by taking into account that social identity comprises two core dimensions.

In particular, theorizing about the “Big Two” in social judgment and behavior (Abele & Wojciszke, 2013) suggests that there are two fundamental content dimensions along which groups are perceived and judged: the agency dimension, representing traits such as strong, competent, influential, and self-determined, and the moral–social dimension, representing traits such as moral, warm, and trustworthy (see also the stereotype content model in Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Building on this theorizing, the needs-based model suggests that due to asymmetries in the power of conflicting groups, their members suffer from asymmetrical identity threats: Members of victim groups experience threat to the agency dimension of their identity, whereas members of perpetrator groups experience threat to the moral–social dimension. The experience of differential threats brings about different motivational states, such that members of victim groups are motivated to restore their sense of agency, whereas members of perpetrator groups are motivated to restore their moral identity. Illustrating these divergent motivations, in interracial interactions in the United States, Blacks wanted to gain respect and acknowledgment of their competence, whereas Whites wished to be liked and viewed as nonracist (Bergsieker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010).

The needs-based model further argues that restoring the positive identities of members of victim and perpetrator groups may increase their readiness to reconcile with each other. Supporting this argument, a message from a Jewish representative that expressed moral–social acceptance of Germans while referring to the context of the Holocaust increased German participants’ willingness to reconcile with the Jews more than a corresponding message that expressed empowerment (i.e., acknowledged the Germans’ right to be strong and self-determined). In contrast, a message of empowerment from a German representative increased Jewish participants’ willingness to reconcile with the Germans more than a message of moral–social acceptance (Shnabel et al., 2009). Subsequent studies found that identity restoration interventions can increase group members’ conciliatory tendencies even without an exchange of messages between the two parties. For example, among group members who perceived their ingroup to be the primary victim of an intergroup conflict, affirming their ingroup’s agency increased conciliatory, pro-social tendencies towards the other group (SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, Aydin, & Ullrich, 2016). Correspondingly, among members of perpetrator groups, offering an apology to the victim group led to restoration of their ingroup’s moral identity and resulted in their increased readiness to reconcile with and compensate the victim group (Barlow et al., 2015).

Although it has not been directly examined, it is likely that these changes in identity elicited corresponding emotional responses. For example, perhaps members of victim groups whose agency was affirmed felt less humiliation, a feeling that is typically associated with vengeful, antisocial tendencies (Lindner, 2006). Similarly, perhaps members of perpetrator groups whose morality was affirmed felt less image shame (i.e., a threatened social image), which leads to negative outgroup orientations (Allpress et al., 2014). Hence, we agree with Čehajić-Clancy et al. that research on the role of emotion regulation in reconciliation processes is highly important. However, the research stands to gain from acknowledging the existence of asymmetrical identity threats (and the consequent need to regulate different emotions) among victim versus perpetrator groups, or powerful versus weak groups—a distinction that is not systematically maintained in Čehajić-Clancy et al.’s review.

Implications of Asymmetrical Needs for Emotion Regulation Interventions

Several examples may illustrate the importance of attending to power asymmetries between conflicting groups. As a first example, in the target article Čehajić-Clancy et al. generally refer to perspective taking as an effective strategy to increase conciliatory tendencies. However, evidence suggests that perspective taking effectively improved outgroup attitudes among members of the stronger party in a conflict but not among members of the weaker party, for whom it might even lead to a negative response (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012; see also Sagy, Kaplan, & Adwan, 2002, for negative reactions among Palestinians when they were asked to consider the perspective of Israelis). For members of the weaker party, it was perspective giving (i.e., discussing the difficulties of life in their society) that led to greater improvement in outgroup attitudes, because it allowed them “to speak and be heard” (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012) and thus addressed their pressing need for empowerment and voice (Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008).

Similarly, interventions based on the contact hypothesis (e.g., structured intergroup encounters), recommended by Čehajić-Clancy et al. as a strategy to promote intergroup empathy and guilt, are typically effective in reducing prejudice among members of powerful, dominant groups but less effective among members of weaker, subordinate groups (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). Indeed, members of dominant and subordinate groups have divergent preferences with regard to intergroup encounters: Whereas members of dominant groups wish to talk about intergroup commonalities, members of subordinate groups wish to talk about power differences between the groups (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). Because contact...
interventions typically focus on increasing mutual acceptance, for example, through discussing communalities and encouraging friendship across group boundaries (Dixon, Durheim, & Tredoux, 2005), they are likely to address the need for moral-social acceptance among members of the powerful group while leaving weaker-group members’ need for empowerment unaddressed. This may account for the relative ineffectiveness of contact interventions for subordinate groups (Shnabel & Ullrich, 2013).

In a similar vein, Čehajić-Clancy et al. recommend the induction of a common, superordinate identity as a means for increasing intergroup empathy, without considering the possibility that such a superordinate identity might threaten minority or victim group members’ need for distinctiveness and restoration of power (Dovidio, Saguy, & Shnabel, 2009). Moreover, inducing a superordinate identity might draw groups’ attention away from the injustice inflicted on the subordinate or victim groups (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009) and thus take the wind out of collective action. As such, it might hinder rather than facilitate positive peace (Christie et al., 2008).

An Alternative Framework: Understanding the Socio-Emotional Route to Reconciliation Through the Prism of Identity Restoration

So far, we have discussed the ways in which Čehajić-Clancy et al.’s framework may benefit from paying greater attention to contextual factors, such as the power relations between the groups—an issue that has been highlighted by the needs-based model (e.g., Nadler & Shnabel, 2008). This framework may additionally benefit from attending to another insight of the needs-based model, which is the importance of addressing group members’ need for positive identity as a route to socioemotional reconciliation. This insight builds on the social identity perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), which argues that group members, who derive their esteem and value from their group membership, strive to protect their ingroup’s identity from threats. We suggest that the group-based emotions experienced by members of conflicting groups can be conceptualized as emanating from identity-related threats (and their possible removal). This conceptualization offers a parsimonious theoretical framework for understanding socioemotional reconciliation, which allows for a better integration of the research reviewed in the target article and additional findings in the field of intergroup reconciliation.

As discussed in the preceding section, asymmetrical identity threats may lead to different emotions among victim and perpetrator groups (e.g., humiliation and shame, respectively) and consequently a need to use different emotion regulation strategies. In addition, a central barrier to reconciliation that was not discussed in the target article is conflicting groups’ engagement in competition over the victim status, that is, competitive victimhood (Leidner, Tropp, & Lickel, 2013; Moscovici & Pérez, 2009; Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2008; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013; Shnabel & Noor, 2012; Sonnenschein, 2008; Sonnenschein & Bekerman, 2010; Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012; see also Vollhardt’s, 2009, 2012, 2015, discussion of the detrimental consequences of exclusive, as opposed to inclusive, victim perceptions).

This competition has been shown to stem from group members’ experience of threats to the ingroup’s moral identity (Shnabel et al., 2013; Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012) and sense of power and agency (Shnabel et al., 2013). Receiving acknowledgment of the ingroup’s victim status can remove these threats, because the victim’s role implies high morality (Gray & Wegner, 2009) as well as entitlement for various forms of social empowerment, such as redress and support from third parties (Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, & Lewis, 2012). Indeed, when members of conflicting groups felt that their ingroup’s victim status was affirmed, they showed heightened positive outgroup orientations, such as forgiveness (Shnabel et al., 2013) and readiness for collective action to promote reconciliation (Siman-Tov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Halabi, 2015).

Of course, group-based emotions are likely involved in these processes. For example, Palestinians and Jews, who are used to competing over the victim status (e.g., Shnabel & Noor, 2012; Sonnenschein & Bekerman, 2010), might have felt relieved when learning that their ingroup had officially “won the crown” of the conflict’s “real” victim (see Siman-Tov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Halabi, 2015). Still, the key to understanding these emotions (and potential effects of their regulation) is through a prism that views group-based emotions as stemming from and reflecting identity-related processes (i.e., the experience of identity threats, and the consequent need to remove them). Using this prism may also allow us to identify the bounding conditions of some of the proposed interventions. For example, it may point to the conditions under which persuading group members that their conflict and suffering are not unique (Kudish, Cohen-Chen, & Halperin, 2015) proposes in the target article as a hope inducing intervention, might backfire, because it threatens group members’ distinctiveness (see Vollhardt’s, 2015, discussion of groups’ need for acknowledgement of their unique suffering).

Future Directions: Exploring the Interplay Between Different Group-Based Emotions

We just discussed how considering power asymmetries and trust levels may be useful for sharpening several of Čehajić-Clancy et al.’s (this issue) assumptions and conclusions regarding emotion regulation interventions and put forward an organizing framework based on identity-related processes. Here we would like to briefly discuss some further observations on the interplay of different group-based emotions that call for integrative future research. In particular, Čehajić-Clancy et al. suggest that offering apologies may be used as an indirect intervention to reduce anger. However, even if we put aside the findings pertaining to the ineffectiveness (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008) and even backfire effects (Harth, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2011) associated with group apologies, the question arises as to
why one group would even begin to consider offering an apology to the other group. A sincere apology reflects an acknowledgment of guilt, suggesting that the intervention proposed for anger reduction in Group A would only work in tandem with an intervention targeting guilt increase in Group B.

Here, as Čehajić-Clancy et al. note, “acknowledgment of ingroup responsibility is rather rare” (see p. 77 in the target article), and hence self-affirmation is among the interventions proposed to regulate guilt. Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, and Ross (2011) found that writing exercises related to important values and reasons for personal pride increased acknowledgment of guilt, but similar exercises related to group values and pride fell short of changing reported guilt. However, it is unclear if the effect of (individual) self-affirmation really operates on the appraisal phase in the modal model of emotion (cf. Gross, 2015) or rather on earlier phases such as situation or attention. Arguably, the exercise of affirming personal values takes away attentional resources from the intergroup conflict, so that it does not produce the same emotional response as before (i.e., acknowledge rather than suppress guilt). However, it may not go a long way in preparing the group-level response of offering an actual apology when the intergroup context is salient again (see Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarthy, 1994, for a discussion of how the saliency of group membership determines people’s responses). As Schmader and Mendes (2015) observed, individuals experiencing high levels of intergroup anxiety may choose to downregulate this emotion by avoiding situations of intergroup contact altogether rather than to reauthenticate what it means to interact on the basis of salient social identities. Thus, future work could address more directly how individual-level interventions (e.g., Čehajić-Clancy et al., 2011) and group-based self-affirmation interventions (e.g., Craig, DeHart, Richeson, & Fiedorowicz, 2012; Derks, Scheepers, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2011; Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2006, 2007, 2009; Gunn & Wilson, 2011; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010; Sherman et al., 2007; Siman-Tov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Halabi, 2015) would mesh with the different phases of the modal model of emotion.

Future research within the proposed framework may also benefit from considering the generality or specificity of different interventions for different emotions. In particular, Čehajić-Clancy et al. argue that their review examines interventions that target beliefs that affect specific, discrete intergroup emotions. However, they did not attempt to distinguish theoretically and/or empirically between the various emotions discussed in the review. To illustrate, Čehajić-Clancy et al. argued that the belief that groups are malleable reduces hatred, whereas the belief that conflicts are malleable increases hope. However, it was not empirically examined (or theoretically explained) whether the belief in groups’ malleability also affects group members’ hope and/or whether the belief in conflicts’ malleability affects group members’ hatred. The same limitation holds for the rest of the reviewed emotions: For example, does the framework proposed by Čehajić-Clancy et al. predict that increasing perceptions of outgroup moral variability would affect intergroup empathy (rather than solely hatred)? And what about perspective taking (proposed as a strategy to increase empathy): Is it possible that it also reduces anger and hatred? Because the unique belief–emotion association that is implied throughout the target article has not been systematically examined so far, it might be more accurate to discuss the reviewed emotion regulation strategies as targeting group members’ general emotional orientation toward the outgroup (i.e., increasing positive outgroup orientations and/or decreasing negative ones).

Indeed, much of the literature on group-based emotions has been devoted to distinguishing between the different emotions and their motivational and behavioral consequences. To mention just a few examples, Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, and Čehajić (2008) pointed to differential effects of guilt and shame; Levin, Kteily, Pratto, Sidanius, and Matthews (2015) to differential effects of anger and disgust; Harth, Leach, and Kessler (2013) to differential effects pride, guilt, and anger; and Allpress et al. (2014) to differential effects of moral shame, image shame, and guilt. Adopting this approach here can provide a more nuanced picture than the one currently provided, which broadly distinguishes between emotions assumed to be destructive (i.e., hatred and anger) and constructive (i.e., guilt, empathy, and hope) to reconciliation. Illustrating the advantages of a more nuanced picture, a study by Halperin, Russell, Dweck, and Gross (2011) revealed that under certain conditions (i.e., when hatred of the outgroup was relatively low) the induction of anger toward Palestinians increased Israeli Jews’ support for compromise. These findings suggest that manipulations that simultaneously reduce hatred and increase anger may be more effective than manipulations targeting a reduction in both emotions (see also Tagar, Federico, & Halperin, 2011, for positive effects of anger in intergroup conflicts).

In yet another illustration, different ideologies of Islamic fundamentalism were found to be associated with different anti-American emotions (Levin et al., 2015). In particular, among Lebanese participants, anger toward Americans predicted support for Hezbollah (a Shia organization) and the wish that it would bring pride and respect to Arabs, whereas disgust and contempt toward Americans predicted support for Al Qaeda (a Sunni organization) and the wish that it would decontaminate Islam from Western cultural influence (Levin et al., 2015). It is thus possible that emotion regulation strategies focused on the reduction of anger might be more effective in promoting conciliatory tendencies toward Americans among Shia Muslims, and strategies focused on reduction of disgust would be more effective among Sunni Muslims.

Summarizing this issue, putting greater emphasis on the distinction(s) between different emotions can shed light on the possible interplay between them, which is impossible when examining each emotion separately (as was done in the reviewed lines of research). Moreover, this emphasis can aid identification of moderating variables, such as ideological tendencies like social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998), which are differentially related to negative

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3 In fact, on p. 84 of the target article, Čehajić-Clancy et al. state that they “do not wish to argue that specific interventions are only exclusively aimed at regulating one specific emotion”—but in this case, the effects of emotion regulation strategies should be discussed, as we argue, in terms of general changes in emotional orientation rather than in terms of changes to specific/discrete emotions.
intergroup emotions (i.e., anger and disgust, respectively; Duckitt, 2001).

**Conclusion**

Emotions play a critical role in the onset, maintenance, escalation, and resolution of conflicts. For this reason, as Cešačić-Clancy et al.'s review demonstrates, emotion regulation strategies have promising practical implications. Nevertheless, emotions are shaped by factors in the social context, especially the power relations and level of intergroup trust. We believe that the decontextualized, depoliticized approach put forward by the proposed framework is limited, as any comprehensive theory of intergroup reconciliation must take these contextual factors into account. An approach to reconciliation that takes these factors into account and examines their influence on identity-related processes, such as the approach put forward by the needs-based model, may provide an effective organizing framework for understanding group-based emotions. We hope that our commentary can help to extend the reach of the framework proposed in the target article and ultimately increase our understanding of the role of emotions in intergroup conflicts, and how they can be recruited to facilitate intergroup reconciliation.

**References**


